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THE DETECTION OF FRAUDS 
Frauds in connection with accounts are very prevalent, 
and their detection is one of the most important func-
tions of the professional accountant. 
During the course of over twenty years' active prac-
tice, the writer has come in contact with innumerable 
instances of fraud of every description, and it will be 
his endeavor in the succeeding paragraphs to outline the 
different kinds most usually encountered, how they can 
be detected, and what methods should be adopted to 
prevent them. 
Frauds in connection with accounts may be, broadly 
speaking, divided into two classes: 
(a) Those perpetrated with the object of concealing 
theft. 
(b) Those which do not involve theft, but which are 
committed with the object of showing a false 
financial condition. 
FRAUDS INVOLVING THEFT 
Theft on the part of persons having the custody of 
cash or securities cannot, of course, be entirely pre-
vented, but by a good system of supervision and audit 
its detection can be absolutely assured. 
There is, however, a firmly ingrained idea among busi-
ness men that a clever bookkeeper can hoodwink them 
no matter what precautions may be taken to prevent his 
doing so. This attitude is not only fatalistic but crimi-
nal. For the sake of his employees, just as much as 
for his own, an employer ought to place such safeguards 
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around the handling of his funds and of his records as 
will reduce to a minimum even the temptation to dis-
honesty ; when he fails to do this, he fails in his duty to 
the community, and should one of his employees yield 
to temptation and steal from him, he himself is to a 
great extent morally responsible for his employee's 
wrongdoing. 
In large commercial offices, it is possible to organize 
such a system of check upon the work of all employees 
as, in the absence of collusion between two or more of 
them, will bring to light irregularities within a short 
time after their occurrence; but in smaller offices where 
the cash and the books of account are handled by the 
same individual, fraud is, of course, more difficult of 
detection. 
Periodical audits by professional accountants are 
always desirable however good in theory may be the 
internal system of check upon employees. The experi-
ence of the writer has been that unless supplemented by 
an audit by professional auditors, a business house's 
own internal audit is likely to become perfunctory and 
slipshod. Besides this, employees are likely to become 
too well acquainted with one another, to rely too much 
on one another's honesty, and also to be overawed too 
easily by their departmental heads or other business 
superiors on whose good will their promotion to a large 
extent depends. 
FRAUDS BY RECEIVING CASHIERS 
Let us assume that a cashier whose cash on hand was 
counted and found correct at January 1, 1916, has sub-
sequently stolen some of his employer's money, and by 
a series of typical examples of gradually increasing 
complexity illustrate the different ways in which he 
might have abstracted the money, the methods he might 
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adopt to cover up his shortage, and the ways in which 
his defalcation should be discovered. 
Example 1 
FAILURE TO DEPOSIT I N BANK ACCOUNT 
Assume that the cashier acts as receiving cashier only 
and has access to no books of account other than his own 
Cash Book; assume further that he has properly entered 
in his Cash Book all monies received by him and has 
correctly totaled his Cash Book but has deposited in the 
bank less than he has received to the extent of $30,000.00 
during the eleven months ending November 30, 1916. 
I t is obvious that in this extremely simple instance, if 
his employers were to obtain a statement from their 
bankers of the amounts deposited from January 1 to 
November 30, the difference between their total and the 
total of the Cash Book should represent cash still in the 
hands of the cashier on November 30, and to the extent 
that he cannot produce cash to that amount he is 
" sho r t , " thus: 
Balance on hand, January 1, 1916 
(As checked and found correct) $ 1,400.00 
Total receipts, January 1—November 30, 
1916, as per Cash Book 2,400,000.00 
$2,401,400.00 
Bank deposits, January 1—November 30, 
1916, as per hank statement 2,370,700.00 
Cash to be accounted for by cashier $ 30,700.00 
Cash actually found to be on hand 700.00 
Shortage $ 30,000.00 
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Observe that in this instance fraud can scarcely be 
said to have been committed. It is a simple case of theft 
unaccompanied by falsification of the books. 
Example 2 
FALSIFICATION OK TOTALS 
Now suppose that the other circumstances being the 
same as in Example 1, the cashier had falsified the 
total of his Cash Book to the extent of the amount of 
his shortage from time to time. What would be the 
result! 
In the first instance, comparison of the totals of his 
Cash Book with a bank statement would indicate no 
irregularity, and the cash actually found on hand would 
appear to be the amount to bo accounted for; thus an 
employer who took no further steps than these to check 
up his receiving cashier's accounts would fail to discover 
the shortage. 
However, since the books of account are presumably 
kept by double entry, the falsification of the Cash Book 
totals would have to be made after the posting thereof 
had been made to the General Ledger (if a cash account 
were carried in the General Ledger, or after the totals 
have been transferred to a "General Cash Book" if the 
General Cash Book balance were treated as entering 
into the trial balance direct), as otherwise the books of 
account would be out of balance to the extent of the 
shortage. Comparison of the Receiving Cash Book 
totals with the General Ledger (or General Cash Book 
as the case might be) would therefore disclose discrep-
ancies which in the aggregate would equal the shortage 
of $30,000.00. 
This illustrates the importance of an employer's 
insisting on having presented to him at the close of 
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(a) Balance as per Cash Book, November 30, 
1916 $93,500.00 
AM: 
Checks entered in Cash Book 
as paid out, but which have 
not yet been presented at 
Bank: 
No. 8079 .$ 75.00 
No. 0642 125.00 
No. 9655 80.00 
No. 9656 20.00 300.00 
$93,800.00 
(b) Balance as per bank statement, Novem-
ber 30, 1916 63,100.00 
(c) Balance in hands of cashier, November 
30, 1916 $30,700.00 
At the time he examines this statement, he should 
satisfy himself that as regards (a) the balance does 
actually agree with the Cash Book and also with the 
Trial Balance Sheet drawn off from the General Ledger. 
(In the case just considered the Cash Book would have 
called for only $700.00 on hand, but the trial balance 
would have called for $30,700.00.) He should satisfy 
himself as regards (b) that the figures agree with the 
statement rendered by the bank and that such statement 
shows no signs of alteration or erasures. As regards 
(c) he should actually count the cash in the hands of 
the cashier or else depute the task to some reliable 
employee other than the cashier. 
each month a reconciliation statement between the bal-
ance shown by the monthly statement furnished to him 
by his banker and the balance called for by his books 
of account in some such form as the following: 
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If an employer or trusted employee other than one 
of the cashiers or the bookkeeper goes through this pro-
cedure each month, no defalcation such as the one just 
considered could escape detection for more than thirty 
days. 
Example 3 
FAILURE TO ENTER RECEIPTS IN CASH BOOK 
Now still assuming that the receiving cashier has 
access to no books of account other than his own Cash 
Book, suppose that he collects currency and checks from 
the firm's customers from time to time aggregating in 
all $30,000.00, which he fails to enter in his Cash Book 
and uses for his own purposes. 
This is the commonest form of fraud by a receiving-
cashier. He gets into debt and "borrows" a relatively 
small sum in the first instance out of his employer's 
money, meaning to replace the amount in a few days; 
he is unable to replace the amount for some time, and 
finding that the theft has not been noticed, he is tempted, 
instead of replacing the original amount abstracted, to 
take more. Almost invariably when such defalcations 
are discovered, it is found that the cashier has been 
gambling or speculating with the money, expecting 
eventually to make good his shortage out of his winnings. 
Now in an instance of this kind none of the procedures 
previously referred to will bring the defalcation to light. 
The books of account will balance correctly, and the 
bank reconciliation statement will be in order. 
If, however, the cashier entirely omits to enter in his 
Cash Book the collections from customers which he has 
misappropriated, it will not be long before one of two 
things happens, viz.: 
(a) As statements of account would in the ordinary 
course of business be made out monthly and sent 
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to the firm's customers by someone other than the 
cashier, complaints as to the inaccuracy of such 
statements will begin to come in from those cus-
tomers who have made payments for which they 
have not been given credit on the statements sent 
them. 
(b) The firm's credit department will notice that cer-
tain customers' accounts are in arrears and begin 
to write them dunning letters. 
In both cases, (a) and (b), inquiry will be aroused 
and the fraud detected. 
Example 4 
WITHHOLDING RECEIPTS OF ONE DATE TO MAKE GOOD 
SHORTAGES OF EARLIER DATES 
Suppose, however, that all circumstances were the 
same as in Example 3, except that instead of omitting 
to enter amounts collected in his Cash Book, the cashier 
simply defers doing so until some days after the collec-
tions in question were actually made. It would be quite 
possible for him to conceal a considerable shortage for 
a long time, unless the auditing procedure, which will be 
explained later, is gone through at frequent intervals. 
His daily bank deposits would agree with the daily 
totals of his Cash Book, and by reason of the very 
slight discrepancies in dates as between the monthly 
statements sent to customers and those shown by the 
customer's own records, suspicion would not in all prob-
ability be aroused. If, for example, a customer writes 
in to complain that a payment made by him on May 27 
was not credited on his May statement and, on looking 
into the matter, the credit department finds that the 
amount in question is entered in the Cash Book on, say, 
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June 1, it would probably be assumed that some delay 
had occurred in the mails, and nothing further would 
be done about the matter. 
In order to operate a fraud of this kind successfully, 
however, it would, of course, be necessary on June 1, 
the date when the cashier did finally enter as a receipt 
the collection that he had misappropriated, for him to 
deposit in the bank the like amount of cash, and he 
would therefore have to withhold from entry as a receipt 
on June 1 some other collection made that day of an 
equal or greater amount, otherwise he would be making 
good the shortage, which is the very thing that he is 
seldom in a position to do. Furthermore, as his short-
age increases, the larger will be the number of items 
that he must defer entering each day, and eventually 
he will get to a point where it will be very difficult for 
him to abstract any further monies without seriously 
risking discovery. 
Such a fraud is most easily operated where a number 
of the receipts are in the form of currency. It is a 
matter of some risk and difficulty for a cashier to obtain 
payment for his own purposes on a check made payable 
to the firm for which he works, although by means of 
forged indorsements it is not by any means impossible. 
I t is also, of course, easier to work a fraud of this kind 
where the individual receipts are of large denomina-
tions, as it would then be necessary to manipulate only 
a relatively few items at any one time. 
An illustration of how a fraud of this kind is operated 
is as follows: 
On January 5 the cashier receives from customers in 
all, say, $6,500.00. Included in this amount is the remit-
tance of Mr. Smith for $231.50, which is in the form of 
currency. The cashier properly enters in the Cash Book 
all the individual items received, with the exception of 
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the remittance of Mr. Smith, which he keeps for his own 
use, and deposits in the bank $6,268.50. 
On January 9 the cashier receives from customers, 
say, $4,000.00. He realizes that it is now time that he 
should account for the remittance of Mr. Smith which 
he stole on January 5; so he enters it as a receipt on 
January 9, but withholds from entry from the receipts 
of January 9 an amount of $295.00 received on that day 
in currency from Mr. Robinson, depositing in the bank 
$3,936.50, the entries in his Cash Book being made up as 
under: 
Receipts of January 9 $4,000.00 
Less: Robinson's remittance 295.00 
— 
$3,705.00 
Add: Smith's remittance of January 5, not 
previously accounted for 231.50 
Amount entered in Cash Book and deposited 
in bank $3,936.50 
Such frauds involve a continual robbing of Peter to 
pay Paul, but so long as the fraud is confined to cur-
rency items, it is almost impossible to detect except by 
accident. The moment, however, the cashier begins to 
appropriate checks, he lays himself open to immediate 
detection. To carry the foregoing example a little fur-
ther, suppose that on January 15 the receipts from cus-
tomers aggregate $5,000.00 but do not happen to contain 
any currency items, and further suppose that the cashier 
finds it very desirable that Mr. Robinson's remittance 
should now be accounted for besides also finding himself 
in need of some more money. He, therefore, enters the 
Robinson item as received on January 15, but with-
holds from entry the check of Mr. Brown for $800.00. 
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His bank deposit for January 15 would, therefore, be 
$4,495.00, and the entries in his Cash Book will be 
arrived at as under: 
Receipts of January 15 $5,000.00 
Less: Brown's check 800.00 
$4,200.00 
Add: Robinson's remittance of January 9, not 
previously accounted for 295.00 
$4,495.00 
Now suppose that on January 20 the receipts of that 
day are $7,000.00 and that the cashier, fearing to with-
hold the Brown item from his Cash Book any longer, 
enters it as a receipt on that day, but to offset this with-
holds from entry a check received from Mr. Hoover for 
$600.00, a check from Mr. Green for $150.00, and cur-
rency received from Mr. Astor for $50.00. His deposit 
will be, of course, $7,000.00, and the amount entered in 
his Cash Book will be arrived at as under: 
Receipts of January 20 $7,000.00 
Less: 
Hoover check. $600.00 
Green check 150.00 
Astor cash 50.00 800.00 
$6,200.00 
Add: Brown's remittance of January 15, not 
previously accounted for 800.00 
$7,000.00 
Now though the amount of his Dank deposit and the 
total of his Cash Book receipts on January 20 will thus 
be in agreement, comparison of the individual items 
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entered in the Cash Book with the individual items 
appearing on his bank deposit slip will reveal the fact 
that they are not identical, i. e., the Hoover, Green, and 
Astor items will form part of the bank deposit, whereas 
no such items will appear in the Cash Book; on the 
other hand, the Brown item will appear in the Cash 
Book, but the bank deposit slip will not show any such 
item as having been deposited. I t is only by comparison 
of the details of the bank deposits with the details of 
the Cash Book receipts of the same day that frauds of 
this sort can be promptly detected. The importance of 
having such comparisons made at frequent intervals by 
an auditor or some trusted employee other than the 
cashier is therefore apparent, and every well-organized 
concern provides for this being done. It is not neces-
sary that such comparisons be made every day, as the 
same moral effect on the cashier will be obtained if he 
knows that it will be done once or twice during the 
month at irregular intervals. 
It is well to emphasize in this connection the extreme 
importance of insisting that a cashier shall deposit the 
whole of his receipts each day and that he shall not be 
allowed to make change or cash checks out of his 
receipts, as otherwise it becomes impossible to detect a 
fraud of the character outlined above by the means 
indicated. 
Example 5 
OVERSTATEMENT OF DISCOUNTS 
A rather clumsy form of theft that is sometimes 
resorted to by a cashier consists of overstating the 
amount of cash discount allowed to a customer and 
of understating the amount of the customer's remittance 
when making the Cash Book entry in regard thereto. 
He then deposits in the bank the amount of the remit-
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tance as shown by his Cash Book and pockets the dif-
ference between that amount and the sum actually 
remitted by the customer. 
In order to obtain any considerable sum of money in 
this way, it is necessary for a cashier to falsify a very 
large number of items, and as this would be almost 
certain to involve remittances made by checks, frauds 
of this kind can be detected by comparison of the details 
appearing on the bank deposit slips with the Cash Book 
in the manner described under Example 4. 
Such frauds can, of course, also be readily detected 
by checking the rates of discount, and this should always 
be done, as quite apart from fraud, mistakes are very 
likely to occur in this connection. 
FRAUDS BY PAYING CASHIER 
The examples hitherto considered (1 to 5) have all 
dealt with frauds on the part of receiving cashiers. 
Frauds by paying cashiers are, however, just as fre-
quently encountered, and the succeeding examples will 
deal with some of the most usual types. 
Example 6 
FALSIFICATION OF TOTALS 
The simplest conceivable fraud by a paying cashier 
consists in overstating the footings of his Cash Book. 
This may be done to conceal the abstraction of currency 
in cases where he is allowed to handle cash or to con-
ceal the fact that he has not entered in his Cash Book 
certain checks drawn by him and on which he has per-
sonally obtained payment in cases where he does not 
handle currency. 
A fraud of this kind cannot be carried on for long if 
all items are posted individually from the Cash Book 
DETECTION OP FRAUDS 15 
to the Ledger, as in such a case the overstatement of 
the totals will result in throwing the General Ledger out 
of balance to the extent of the overstatement. Cash 
Books, however, often contain analysis columns into 
which are entered under appropriate headings the most 
common items of expense (e. g., salaries, traveling 
expenses, etc.), and the totals only of such analysis 
columns are posted to the Ledger. "Where this is the 
case, both the grand total column and one of the analysis 
colunms totals would, of course, be overstated by the 
defrauding cashier, and as the grand total column repre-
sents a credit to Cash Account in the General Ledger 
and as the analysis column total would be posted to the 
debit of a General Ledger account, the books would not 
be thrown out of balance. 
Frauds of this kind can, of course, be discovered by 
the simple process of checking the Cash Book additions, 
but it must be noted that unless this is done, the mere 
fact that the total of the disbursements as shown by the 
Cash Book agrees with the total of the withdrawals from 
the bank as shown by the bank statement at the end of 
the month is no guarantee of the accuracy of the Cash 
Book. For example, suppose a cashier whose monthly 
salary is $175.00 draws his own salary check in dupli-
cate, cashes both checks at the bank, but enters the item 
only once in his Cash Book overstating the total of the 
page on which the items appear, however, to the extent 
of $175.00. The result will be that the Cash Book total 
and the total of the bank withdrawals as per the bank 
statement will agree, and the fraud can be discovered 
only by checking the Cash Book totals or by comparing 
the canceled checks returned by the bank in detail with 
the Cash Book. 
This illustrates the folly of an employer who fails to 
have the clerical accuracy of his cashier's work checked 
over either by outside auditors or by members of his 
16 HAROLD BENINGTON 
own staff. The writer has encountered innumerable 
instances where money has been systematically stolen 
for a considerable period of time by the means just 
described. 
Example 7 
DUPLICATION OF PAYMENTS 
Most business houses take the precaution of requiring 
several responsible employees to initial as correct the 
invoices or other documents supporting any disburse-
ment, and the treasurer or other official of the company 
who actually signs checks is required to see that this 
has been done before he attaches his signature to the 
check. He himself should also initial the invoices or 
otherwise mark them as having been produced to him 
in support of a check which he has signed, otherwise he 
has no guarantee that the same documents may not be 
produced to him over and over again and several checks 
thus be obtained for the same item, only one of which 
may be turned over to the creditor in question, the 
cashier forging indorsements on the others and paying 
them into his own bank account or that of a confederate. 
If a regular and detailed audit of the concern's affairs 
is made, it would eventually be noticed that certain of 
the checks were not supported by proper vouchers, as 
of course there would be in existence only one genuine 
set of invoices, etc., to support the bona fide payment to 
the creditors and the bogus payments which had been 
misappropriated by the cashier. In the meantime, how-
ever, if the cashier has obtained possession of the can-
celed checks which bore his forged indorsements and 
has destroyed them, it would be almost impossible to 
convict him of fraud, however strong the circumstantial 
evidence might be. All that could be proved would be 
that the checks and the invoices in support of certain 
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payments were missing from the files. In such a case 
it is extremely hard to prove, to the satisfaction of a 
jury, who indorsed the lost checks and who is respon-
sible for their disappearance. 
Furthermore, unless the invoices are initialed or 
otherwise identified as having been paid by the party 
signing the check, if as is frequently the case, the cashier 
has the custody of or access to the files containing old 
invoices and vouchers, it is possible for him to take out 
an invoice dated, say, May 14, 1916, and by merely alter-
ing it to read May 14, 1917, to supply himself with a 
document which on its face would appear perfectly in 
order as the supporting evidence for a check and not 
only would deceive his employer, but in all probability 
would pass the scrutiny of professional auditors. 
Example 8 
PAY-BOLL FRAUDS 
Frauds in connection with pay rolls are of very fre-
quent occurrence. Where, as is often the case, the cashier 
makes up the pay roll and also pays off the men, it is 
easy for him to include the names of fictitious employees 
and misappropriate the wages credited to them. I t is 
also not uncommon for a cashier to overstate the hours 
worked or the rates of pay of actual employees and to 
pocket the difference between the amount which appears 
on the pay roll as due to them and the true amount of 
their wages which he actually turns over to them. 
It is, therefore, very important that pay rolls should 
be audited by comparison with time-clock cards, time-
keeper's and foremen's reports, or other records inde-
pendent of those kept by the paying cashier. 
It must also be remembered that collusion between a 
cashier and foremen or other employees is more liable 
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to occur in connection with wages than in any other way 
and that it is therefore desirable occasionally to supple-
ment the checking of one book record with another by a 
little practical detective work. The writer well remem-
bers the investigation of a pay roll some years ago by 
his office, where it transpired that a certain " A . Bruin ," 
who had been drawing modest but regular wages for 
some weeks, was, as a matter of fact, a brown bear 
which one of the workmen had brought home from a 
hunting trip and which had been adopted as a sort of 
mascot by the workpeople, some one of whom had 
devised this ingenious plan for paying for its board 
and transportation. Everybody seemed to know about 
its being on the pay roll except the proprietor of the 
business. 
FRAUDS BY CASHIERS HANDLING BOTH 
RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS 
In the examples already given, the writer has assumed 
that the businesses concerned were of sufficient magni-
tude to warrant the employment of different persons to 
handle receipts and payments. 
Many concerns, however, are for the sake of economy 
obliged to entrust the handling of both receipts and pay-
ments to the same individual, and where this is done, 
the opportunities for fraud on the par t of the cashier 
are enormously increased. He can, of course, perpetrate 
any or all of the types of fraud already described and 
in addition many others. The following is an instance. 
Example 9 
WITHHOLDING CHECKS TO BALANCE SHORT-DEPOSITS 
Suppose in any particular month a cashier draws a 
check in favor of one of the firm's creditors for, say, 
$1,200.00, enters it as paid on the payment side of his 
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Cash Book but does not mail it to the creditor, and at 
the same time deposits in the bank $1,200.00 less than 
his actual receipts for the month. What is the result! 
The cashier has obtained $1,200.00 for his own use, and 
yet the balance shown by his Cash Book will agree with 
the balance shown by the bank's statement, and the 
accounts of both creditors and debtors in the Ledgers 
will appear to be in order. The fraud will, therefore, 
not come to light until the creditor whose check was not 
mailed to him complains of not having received pay-
ment, unless the canceled checks returned by the bank 
and the deposits recorded in the bank statement are 
compared in detail with the Cash Book. The impor-
tance of going through this procedure is therefore very 
evident, and this example once more illustrates the 
necessity of auditing a cashier's transactions in con-
siderable detail. 
I t may be pointed out that in many businesses where 
individual transactions are, for large amounts and where 
it is customary to make payments to creditors " o n 
account" it would be quite possible to hold back checks 
intended for creditors in the manner described above 
for several months without exciting their suspicion, par-
ticularly so if the cashier were to call upon them or 
write to them on his firm's letter paper, giving some 
reasonable excuse for the delay. 
FRAUDS BY CASHIERS W H O Also ACT AS BOOKKEEPERS 
Many small business houses, of course, entrust the 
keeping of all their books to a single individual. Where 
this is the case, the opportunities for fraud are almost 
unlimited, unless very strict supervision is exercised by 
the proprietor or a rigorous audit is made a t frequent 
intervals. This is especially so because his control of 
the bookkeeping gives him every conceivable oppor-
tunity for making any falsification of his accounts that 
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may be necessary to conceal his defalcations. In addi-
tion to all the types of fraud previously described, such 
a bookkeeper-cashier could among others perpetrate the 
following. 
Example 10 
DIRECT LEDGER ENTRIES TO CONCEAL THEFT 
A bookkeeper-cashier having received a payment from 
Mr. Brown, a customer of the firm, keeps the money for 
his own use, makes no entry in regard to it in the Cash 
Book, but credits Mr. Brown's personal account in the 
Ledger and at the same time charges an expense account 
in the Ledger with the same amount. In this case the 
customer's Ledger account will be correct; the Cash 
Book balance will agree with that shown by the bank 
statement, and the books of account will be in trial bal-
ance. The only way in which the fraud could be dis-
covered would be by checking the detailed postings to 
the Ledger, whereupon it would develop that both a 
credit and a debit for the like amount, the one affecting 
a personal account and. the other an expense account, 
could not be traced to the books of original entry. 
Example 11 
JOURNAL ENTRIES TO CONCEAL T H E F T 
I t is the writer's experience that employers are aston-
ishingly careless about scrutinizing the journal entries 
which go through their books, and seem to think they are 
" just book entries" and, therefore, only of academic 
interest. 
A bookkeeper-cashier can, however, very easily make 
journal entries crediting the account of persons whose 
remittances he has misappropriated and charging imper-
sonal accounts such as Allowances or Returned Goods 
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with similar amounts. In such cases everything will 
apparently be in order, and unless the proprietor or the 
auditor examines the journal entries in detail very care-
fully, the frauds will escape detection. 
Example 12 
POSTINGS TO WRONG ACCOUNT 
Again by means of posting such items as salaries, 
postage, rent, etc., to wrong accounts in the General 
Ledger it is possible for a bookkeeper-cashier to make 
payment of the same item more than once, misap-
propriating the duplicate payment for his own pur-
poses, and yet to make it appear from a cursory 
scrutiny of his Ledger accounts as though everything 
were in order. In such cases only a careful analysis 
of all the impersonal Ledger accounts or the detailed 
checking of all postings will reveal the fraud. 
FRAUDS BY STOREKEEPERS AND OTHERS 
HAVING CUSTODY OF MATERIALS 
The concealment of theft of material by means of 
falsification of the books of account is less frequent 
than the case of theft of money, not because of any 
greater difficulty in manipulating the records in such 
cases, but because of the practical difficulty of removing 
the actual merchandise in question without detection. 
In manufacturing businesses, however, where raw 
material of high intrinsic value is used, such as ingot 
tin or platinum, it is very important that materials 
should be issued from stores only on the authority of 
requisitions signed by responsible employees and that 
the storekeeper's receipts and deliveries of material be 
checked up at frequent intervals with the purchase 
invoices and the signed requisitions for withdrawals. 
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It is also very important in such cases that a. good 
system for recording manufacturing costs be in use so 
that theft on the par t of those requisitioning material 
from stores will be indicated by the increased cost of 
manufacture shown by the books as a result of such 
theft. 
Unless the precautions mentioned are taken, it is, of 
course, quite easy for the storekeeper to enter in his 
records as having been issued for manufacturing pur-
poses material which he has stolen. 
I t should also be remembered that unless a good sys-
tem of internal check is in use, it is always possible for 
the head of the purchasing department to order material 
in the name of his employers but cause it to be delivered 
elsewhere than at his employer's place of business (e. g., 
such materials as coal, lumber, etc., the identity of which 
is easily lost). Frauds of this last-mentioned character 
can be detected only by careful comparison of receiving 
records with purchase invoices. I t is important that 
such comparisons should be made by an employee whose 
regular duties are not connected with the stores depart-
ment or the purchasing department. 
FBAUDS COMMITTED WITH OBJECT OF SHOWING 
FALSE FINANCIAL CONDITION BUT W H I C H 
Do NOT INVOLVE THEFT 
Frauds of this character are of far greater impor-
tance, of greater variety, and of graver consequence 
than those committed for the purpose of concealing 
theft. Thefts capable of being concealed by the falsifi-
cation of accounts rarely involve cases of such mag-
nitude as to ruin a business absolutely as, where really 
large sums of currency are involved, sooner or later the 
resultant shortage of working capital and the conse-
quent inability of the concern to meet its current lia-
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bilities, in spite of the fact that its Profit or Loss 
Account shows it to be making money, will lead to 
investigations which will bring the shortage to light. 
On the other hand, falsification of accounts with the 
object of showing a financial condition not in accord-
ance with the facts invariably involves very considerable 
sums of money, and on account of the fact that the pro-
prietor of the business himself or at any rate someone 
occupying a high official position in the concern is usu-
ally responsible for the fraud, its existence will come to 
light only as the result of investigations set on foot by 
someone not actively connected with the management of 
the business in question. 
Example 13 
FALSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WITHOUT 
CORRESPONDING FALSIFICATION OF BOOKS 
OF ACCOUNT 
The simplest type of fraud of this sort consists in 
the presentation to bankers, stockholders, investors, or 
others of statements which purport to show the financial 
condition of a business on a particular date or of its 
earnings for a particular period, but which do not rep-
resent the facts and are not in accordance with the 
books of account. 
Bankers are the most frequent victims of this kind 
of fraud, and bitter experience has now led them almost 
invariably to insist that the financial statements sub-
mitted to them as a basis of the extension of credit be 
certified as correct by reputable public accountants. 
Such frauds can, of course, be immediately detected 
by comparison of the statements in question with the 
books of account. In spite of this it is remarkable how 
frequently such frauds are practiced, the reason, of 
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course, being that they can be committed without any-
one's having knowledge of them except the persons who 
actually commit the frauds, whereas if the books of 
account are "doctored" to correspond with the state-
ments, it is quite possible that some intelligent employee 
will observe the fact and inform the parties about to be 
defrauded of what has been done. Frauds of this type 
have, however, only their simplicity to recommend them 
and have the great disadvantage from the point of view 
of the persons committing them that responsibility for 
them can be directly traced to their perpetrators with 
uncomfortable consequences. 
Example 14 
UNDERSTATEMENT OR OVERSTATEMENT OP INVENTORIES 
The falsification of merchandise inventory figures is 
one of the most favorite vehicles of fraud on the part 
of those wishing to show a false financial condition. 
The reason for its popularity is the fact that it is 
generally impossible from a scrutiny of the books of 
account or even by means of a detailed audit to deter-
mine, except inferentially, what should be the value of 
the merchandise on hand at any particular date. More-
over, as the character of the merchandise changes from 
day to day, any attempt to check up the accuracy of 
the values claimed on one date by comparison with 
the values ascertained by means of an independent 
appraisal at a later date involves considerable time 
and expense and is somewhat inconclusive in its results. 
Besides this, frauds of this character can be com-
mitted in such a way as to make it almost impossible 
to fix responsibility of its commission. If it is assumed 
that it is actually the proprietor who is morally respon-
sible for the inflation of an inventory, he can none the 
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less readily cause the actual clerical work involved in 
the compilation of the figures to be performed by others 
without their realizing that anything fraudulent is in 
contemplation. An inventory usually involves the coop-
eration of quite a number of employees, and in the 
process of counting quantities, pricing them, copy-
ing drafts, and making final typed statements there is 
ample opportunity for an employer to inject figures and 
quantities, responsibility for the insertion of which it 
will afterwards be impossible to trace. 
In this connection it is well to point out that it is not 
always the proprietor or the general manager of a busi-
ness who is interested in the falsification of inventory 
figures. Very often departmental managers, factory 
superintendents, or even foremen are partially remuner-
ated upon the basis of the earnings of the business; in 
such cases the proprietor should exercise great caution 
in supervising the taking of inventories, otherwise he 
may find that he has paid large commissions based on 
nonexistent profits in respect of a particular year to 
employees who have since left his service. 
Example 15 
INFLATION OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
I t is sometimes sought to show a better financial 
condition and to improve the earnings of a particular 
period by passing through the books of account a num-
ber of fictitious sales. In such cases this is generally 
done at the very end of the financial year, and the sales 
in question are written back early in the succeeding 
financial year so that the fraudulent condition of the 
books only exists for a few days or weeks at the most. 
Such a fraud, if committed in connection with the 
affairs of a concern of any magnitude, can hardly be 
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done without the knowledge of some of the employees 
of the concern involved and is, therefore, a very dan-
gerous procedure; but where a smaller business is in 
question, it can be done with far less chance of its being 
discovered, owing to the more lax system of internal 
organization which usually exists. 
Comparison of shipping records with Sales Books will 
disclose frauds of this kind, and professional auditors 
do this to the extent of making selective tests in order 
to satisfy themselves that no such fraud is being 
committed. 
Example 16 
CONCEALMENT OF LIABILITIES 
T h e deliberate omission of liabilities from books of 
account is often a very difficult thing to detect. 
Where trade liabilities are in question it should, theo-
retically, be possible to detect their omission by check-
ing receiving records to ascertain that liabilities have 
been set up for all goods received, and here again 
auditors are accustomed to make selective tests along 
these lines. Anyone who has had extensive experience 
of commercial affairs will, however, realize that the. 
task is too laborious to admit of its being performed 
exhaustively and that owing to the poor shape in which 
receiving records are generally kept, it is not an easy 
mat ter . (Perfectly innocent mistakes are frequently 
made by really well-organized business concerns by 
including in their merchandise inventory goods which 
have been received and taken into stock but credit for 
which, for one reason or another, has not at the date 
of such inventory been given, on the books of account, 
to the creditors who supply the goods.) 
Where the liabilities omitted, however, represent bank 
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loans and where the proceeds of such loans have never 
been brought on to the books of account, it is almost 
impossible for an auditor to discover their omission. 
An actual example of this sort came under the notice 
of the writer comparatively recently. The treasurer 
and the manager of a large corporation engaged in the 
grain business borrowed a very considerable sum of 
money in the name of their company from bankers with 
whom the company did not usually have dealings. They 
signed the company's name to notes for the amount bor-
rowed and paid the proceeds into a special bank account. 
They then proceeded to engage in speculative deals on 
their own account, operating them through the special 
bank account in question. Their speculations were 
unsuccessful, and they were unable to meet the notes 
given to the banks at maturity. The notes were 
renewed two or three times, but eventually the bankers 
insisted on payment, whereupon the whole circumstances 
of the transaction came to light. 
These men were authorized to pledge the credit of 
their company and had done so in this instance. In 
submitting financial statements to the company's bank-
ers, however, the liability for these notes was not dis-
closed; no entries appeared on the company's books in 
regard to them and it would, therefore, have been impos-
sible for anyone to detect their existence by an audit 
of the books however searching. Frauds of this char-
acter are occasionally discovered through the parties 
committing them by their making interest payments con-
nected with the suppressed liabilities out of the regular 
bank account of the business. Where this is so, an 
analysis of the Interest Account would indicate to an 
auditor that interest had been paid in connection with 
liabilities not appearing on the books. The perpetrators 
of such a fraud would generally, however, have the fore-
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sight to meet the interest on such bank loans out of their 
own funds, and the auditors would therefore encounter 
nothing to arouse their suspicions. 
Example 17 
OVERSTATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND PROPRIETOR'S 
WITHDRAWALS 
I t is not by any means uncommon for the proprietor 
of a retail business who is contemplating selling out 
b is business to manipulate his records so as to show 
a n earning capacity considerably in excess of what is 
actually the case. One of the favorite methods adopted 
for accomplishing this result is to ring up on the cash 
register a number of fictitious sales. 
Suppose the proprietor of a store rings up on 
the register $50.00 more than was actually received 
for each day during a particular week and enters 
these inflated totals in his Cash Book. He, of course, 
will have recorded earnings of $300.00 in excess of 
what was really taken in from customers. If he, to 
offset this, enters on the payment side of the Gash 
Book personal withdrawals of like amount, it is obvious 
tha t his books of account will on the face of things 
appear to be correct. That is to say, the balance shown 
by his bank statement will agree with that shown by 
his Cash Book, and an auditor comparing the register 
readings with the Cash Book would find them in agree-
ment. Inasmuch as nearly all the receipts of a store 
a r e in the form of currency, the fact that the daily 
bank deposits did not agree with the amounts shown 
in the Cash Book would not excite any particular 
suspicion on the pa r t of auditors, it being reasonable 
to suppose that the proprietor would withhold from 
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the cash receipts whatever money he needed for his 
own use. 
The only way in which a fraud of this sort can be 
discovered is by comparison of the percentage which 
the cost of goods sold bears to the sales during the 
period under investigation with similar percentages for 
other periods and other concerns in the same line of 
business. Should it be found that an abnormal gross 
profit had apparently been earned, suspicion would, of 
course, be aroused. The fact that a proprietor appears 
to have been withdrawing for his own use more money 
than usual and more than should be necessary for his 
current expenses should always arouse suspicion on 
the part of an auditor. 
CONCLUSION" 
It would, of course, be possible to give a great many 
more examples of how books of account can be fraudu-
lently manipulated, but enough have been instanced to 
demonstrate that investors and those lending money on 
the strength of a financial position, as disclosed by books 
of account, are acting recklessly unless they insist upon 
an investigation of such financial condition in their 
behalf by competent auditors. 
I t has also been sought to demonstrate by means of 
the foregoing examples why it is necessary for pro-
prietors and managers either to establish an efficient 
system of internal audit or to employ the services of 
professional auditors to go over such matters in their 
behalf at reasonably frequent intervals. In this con-
nection it is most important that the system of account-
ing used be so devised as to provide the proper 
machinery for checking up one department against 
another and to fix responsibility for the transac-
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tions recorded, the prices paid, etc. Unless this is so, 
it is impossible for proprietors to supervise their affairs 
adequately and useless to call in the services of pro-
fessional accountants, as without such machinery it is 
impossible for them, in the very nature of things, to 
arrive at any definite conclusions. 
TEST QUESTIONS 
These questions are for the reader to use in testing 
his knowledge of the lecture. The answers should be 
written out fully in a notebook, but are not to be sent in. 
1. With what two general classes of frauds does the account-
ant have to deal? 
2. What does the term "internal check" mean to you ? Does 
a. good system of internal check depend in any way upon the 
size of a concern ? 
3. What form of fraud is most frequently met, with in 
auditing the accounts of a receiving cashier? As an auditor 
suspecting a fraud of this character, how would you proceed 
to detect it? 
4. In the ease of a cashier who is also a bookkeeper, how 
would you ascertain whether he has abstracted cash and charged 
it to an expense account? 
5. Suggest a scheme whereby the records of a storekeeper 
in charge of valuable raw materials may be checked up fre-
quently and easily by the general office. 
6. In checking a cashier suspected of fraud, can you see 
any stronger reasons for checking page totals that come near the 
end of the month than others? 
7. For what reasons is even the most scientific system of 
internal check that can be devised likely to be inadequate to 
disclose irregularities of a fraudulent character? 
8. Indicate cases of fraud which are likely to come to light 
in the ordinary course of business. Show how they will be 
disclosed. 
9. Why should a treasurer always be careful to initial in-
voices for which he has drawn checks ? 
10. Suggest a system of check that will prevent padding of 
pay rolls with fictitious names. In the absence of sufficient inter-
nal check, how would you as an auditor ascertain if pay roll 
frauds were being perpetrated? 
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11. What advantages are gained by requiring that all cash 
receipts be deposited each day intact, and that all payments 
be made by cheek? 
12. "Why is it advisable to avoid entrusting the duties of a 
cashier and bookkeeper to the same individual ? Can this always 
be done? 
13. Specify some of the methods that a bookkeeper-cashier 
may take to conceal frauds. How would you as an auditor pro-
ceed to detect these ? 
14. Give reasons why frauds are sometimes committed which 
disclose a false condition of business. How do such frauds com-
pare in importance with those that simply involve theft? 
15. Who are usually found to be perpetrators of such frauds 
as mentioned in question 14 ? 
16. In order to protect themselves, what do bankers and care-
ful investors insist on in connection with fiscal statements? 
17. Mention the chief difficulties in the way of detecting and 
proving fraud in connection with inventory valuation. 
18. What object might a factory superintendent have in 
overvaluing an inventory and under what circumstances? 
19. Suppose the general manager of a concern should 
attempt to show an improvement of earnings by entering a 
number of fictitious sales upon the books. How would you as 
an auditor detect such fraud? 
20. Why is it particularly difficult to audit the earnings 
of a retail store ? How can the proprietor of such a store inflate 
his sales and profits and still mate his books appear correct? 
What circumstances will arouse your suspicions that such infla-
tion had taken place ? 
21. Give a number of the best reasons that occur to you 
why a concern should have thorough periodic audits of its 
books and records by a firm of independent and trustworthy 
accountants. 
